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According to Kant,  we are responsible  for, and  can be blamed  for, 
our beliefs. 
 
[W]e can of course blame someone  who has given approval to a 
false cognition,  namely, when the responsibility actually lies with 
him for rejecting those grounds  that could have convinced him of 
the object of the  cognition  he has,  and  could  have  freed  him  
from  his error.  (ll, p. 126 [24:160])12  
 
In line with many contemporary philosophers, Kant treats as 
obvious the fact that  we are epistemically responsible  and yet denies 
the possibility of a direct influence of the will on our beliefs:3  ‘The 
will does not have any influence immediately  on holding-to-be-true; 
this
                                                             
1 As the following works by Kant are cited frequently, I have used the following 
abbreviations: LL (Lectures on Logic), LA (Lectures on Anthropology), G 
(Groundwork), A (Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View), CPR (Critique 
of Pure Reason), CPrR (Critique of Practical Reason), CJ (Critique of the Power of 
Judgment), MM (Metaphysics of Morals), CF (Conflict of Faculties), WOT (What 
Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?), WE (What is Enlightenment?). The 
reference in square bracket is to the Akademie edition of Kant’s works. 
2 See also ll (p. 130 [24:165]):  ‘[W]hen one judges and accepts something  before 
investigation, with the resolve not to undertake any closer investigation 
concerning  the whole thing, but rather  to rest completely content  with it, then 
this is in fact a punishable prejudice’. 
3 See, for instance, Shah (2002,  p. 436). For traditional arguments against 




would  be quite  absurd’  (ll, p. 577  [9:74]).  Although many,  if not 
all, of our beliefs are beyond  the realm of direct voluntary control, 
he allows for an indirect form of influence of the will on judgement, 
through the capacity to direct our cognition  according  to principles. 
Whether  we are right or wrong,  whether  our beliefs are justified or 
unjustified,  we can  be held responsible  for  them  because  we have 
this capacity.4  The aim of this paper  is not defend this claim but to 
draw out its implications  for the possibility of developing a Kantian 
account  of the ethics of belief. To do so, I deploy the tools provided 
by Kant’s ethics in order  to determine  whether  a coherent  account of 
the ethics of belief can be gleaned. 
I begin with the exposition  of what I take to be Kant’s account  of the 
fundamental norms that govern our epistemic activities, the principles 
of the sensus communis. I then propose  that  an epistemic 
universalizability test can be formulated on the model of its ethical 
counterpart. I discuss the test cases of evidentialism  and testimony, 
and show that  they produce  the right kind of results. I conclude  by 
drawing  the implications  of my account  for Kant’s ethics of belief, 
and  in particular the claim  that  our  actions  and  our  thoughts  are 
subject to the same rational norm. Although  much of the 
interpretation put forward in this paper  will remain  programmatic, I 
hope to show that  it has the potential  to provide  a robust  Kantian  
account of the ethics of belief, an account that is both plausible from 
the perspective of Kant scholarship  and capable  of contributing to 
current debates in the ethics of belief. 
 
 
1. Epistemic   Principles  and  the  Maxims  of  Thinking 
Throughout Kant’s works,  from his early Lectures on Logic to his 
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View,  he distinguishes  three 
‘principles of thinking’ under the label sensus communis: first, to think 
for oneself (‘the maxim  of thinking  for  oneself  can  be called  the  
enlightened mode  of  thought’);  second,  to  think  in the  place  of 
another (‘the maxim  of putting  oneself in the viewpoint  of others  in 
thought, the extended mode of thought’); and third,  to always think 
consistently with  oneself  (‘the  maxim  of  always  thinking   in  
                                                             




agreement   with oneself, the consequent  or coherent mode of thought’) 
(ll, pp. 563 –4 [9:57]).5 These three ‘[u]niversal rules and conditions  
for avoiding error’ are the principles according to which we ought to 
think. Their function  is to guide our thoughts, or to use the title of one 
of Kant’s essays, to orient  ourselves in thinking.  They are second-
order principles that specify the correct way of thinking  and thereby 
guide the reflective attitude we should adopt  upon our first-order 
cognitive procedures. 
Once an agent adopts  a principle,  it becomes what  Kant calls 
his maxim: ‘A rule that the subject makes his principle is called a 
maxim’ (ll, p. 473 [24:738]).  A maxim  formulates  an agent’s policy 
or intention.  Most familiar are the maxims that guide our actions, 
which include  our  moral  maxims.  They are ‘the subjective  
principle[s]  of acting … the principle[s] in accordance  with which the 
subject acts’ (g,  p. 73 n.  [4:421]).  Less familiar  are  our  epistemic  
maxims,  the subjective principles of thinking  that  constitute ‘the way 
of thinking [Denkungsart] needed to make a purposive use of [the 
faculty of cog- nition]’ (cj, p. 175 [5:295]).6 Whilst this definition  may 
not be particularly enlightening,  what  Kant has in mind is, I believe, 
relatively straightforward. Epistemic maxims constitute an agent’s 
epistemic strategy:  how should  he think  about  the world?  How  can 
he make the best use of his cognitive abilities? Quite tellingly, Kant 
notes that the aim of university education  is to instil students with the 
right epistemic principles: 
 
[I]nstruction in universities is properly  this, to cultivate the 
capacity of reason,  and  to get [students]  into  the habit  of the 
method  of ratiocinating,  and to establish the appropriate 
                                                             
5 See also la (p. 520 [25:1480]), cj (pp. 174–5 [5:294–5])  and a (p. 333 
[7:228]). I cannot discuss the content  of these maxims here due to lack of space, 
but for helpful discussions see McBay Merritt (2011,  §2), Wood  (2002,  p. 103) 
and O’Neill (1989,  chs. 1–2). 
6 Note that this paper is not concerned  with regulative principles of reason 
such as the principle of systematic unity in cpr (pp. 620–1 [a700 / b729]).  
They are commonly  interpreted as either transcendental or methodological 
principles (respectively, in Guyer 2000 and Grier 
2001,  amongst  others),  but  it has recently  been argued  that  they should  be 
thought of as practical principles (Mudd  2013). As far as I can tell, my account  




maxims of reason.  (la, p. 107 [25:547])7 
 
Once the right epistemic maxims  have been adopted, actual  aware- 
ness of them and conscious reflection upon them is not necessary for 
every single case of belief acquisition:  ‘For common  cognition  it is 
not necessary that we be conscious of these rules and reflect on them’ 
(ll, p. 15 [24:27]).8 Reflection is required only in cases where we are 
considering  complex or uncertain  beliefs: 
 
[I]f our  understanding wants  to have  ascended  to learned  
cognition, then it must be conscious  of its rules and use them in 
accordance with reflection,  because  here  common  practice  is 
not  enough  for  it.  (ll, p. 15 [24:27]) 
 
In  certain   cases,  when  judgements   are  not  immediately   certain, 
when new evidence emerges or when what we believe is thrown into 
doubt,  we can, and ought  to, reflect upon  our beliefs by investigating 
their ‘grounds of proof’ (ll, p. 125 [24:158]).  In this sense, epistemic 
principles leave plenty of room for differences of opinion, arguments  
and  even disagreements, and  following  the right  ones is not sufficient 
to ensure that our beliefs are justified. What counts as a sufficient 
ground, what constitutes  indisputable evidence, how probable  a  
hypothesis   is,  are  all  a  matter   of  the  exercise  of  ‘a practised  
faculty of judgment’ (ll, p. 577  [9:74]).  Thus,  whilst the principles  of 
the sensus communis express the fundamental normative 
requirements of cognition,  they do not exhaust  the demands  on our 
first-order epistemic activities. 
 
[W]e must first of all reflect, i.e., see to which power of cognition  
                                                             
7 See also Kant’s claim that  we recognize a sound  reason ‘by the maxims,  
when its maxims are so constituted, that  its greatest  use is possible by their 
means. … The maxim  of sound reason  is as follows:  not  to  accept  as valid 
any other  rule in its use than  this,  [the  one] 
whereby the most universal use of reason is possible, and whereby its use is 
facilitated’ (la, p. 109 [25:548–9]). 
8 See also cpr (p. 366 [a261 / b317]): ‘Not all judgments require an 
investigation, i.e. attention  to the grounds  of truth;  for if they are immediately  
certain,  e.g., between  two points there can be only one straight  line, then no 





a cognition  belongs,  and then investigate,  i.e., test whether  the 
grounds are  sufficient  or  insufficient  in regard  to  the  object.  
(ll, pp. 576–7 [9:73]) 
 
The nature  of the grounds  of our beliefs determines  their epistemic 
mode. Depending  on whether  they are subjective or objective, 
sufficient or insufficient, different modes of ‘holding to be true’ 
(fürwahrhalten)  obtain:9 knowledge  (wissen), which is both 
subjectively and objectively sufficient; opinion  (meinen),  which is 
subjectively as well as objectively insufficient; and faith (glauben), 
which is only subjectively   sufficient   and   objectively   insufficient   
(cpr,   p. 686 [a822 / b850]).10 For a belief to count as knowledge,  it 
requires sufficient subjective as well as objective grounds.  Otherwise  it 
is not knowledge  but mere opinion  or faith. And whilst it is 
                                                             
9 As Stevenson has noted,  ‘it has recently been common  for philosophers 
writing in English to use the word  “believe”  (or “assent”) in this wide sense, 
meaning  any sort of holding  a proposition to  be true,  however  confident  or  
hesitant,  rational or  irrational, justified  or unjustified. It would thus be 
tempting to translate Kant’s verb fürwahrhalten as “believe”.  In t hat usage, 
knowledge  implies belief; and “mere” belief, without any sufficient 
justification, will then  be the  kind  of belief which  does  not  amount to  
knowledge’  (Stevenson  2011, p. 97). See also Chignell (2007b, p. 34): ‘In 
contemporary discussions,  the fundamental attitude is assumed to be belief. 
For Kant (as for Locke, Leibniz, and some others in the early modern   
tradition),  the  attitude is  Fürwahrhalten — “assent”  or,  literally,  
“holding-for- true”. Assent for these writers is the genus of which most other  
positive propositional attitudes (opining, having faith in, knowing,  and the 
like) are species. Kant doesn’t have an exact equivalent  of our contemporary 
concept of belief, but if he did that concept would also fit under the genus of 
assent.’ 
10 By contrast with subjective grounds,  objective grounds  ‘are independent of 
the nature and interest  of the subject’ (ll, p. 574  [9:70]).  Objective  grounds  
may originate  from  experience or reason.  They may include perceptions, 
memories,  observations as well as evidence, inferences,  deductions, logical 
proofs,  or some combination thereof.  Their  strength  warrants  a matching  
degree of objective certainty  in the subject, from insufficient to sufficient: 
‘When we know,  namely, that  we are free of all subjective grounds  and yet the 
holding-to- be-true is sufficient, then we are convinced,  and in fact logically 
convinced, or convinced on objective  grounds  (the  object  is certain)’  (ll, p. 
576  [9:72]).  Since there  is no  space  to develop Kant’s account  of the grounds  




permissible to hold opinions,  it is only so qua opinion,  ‘with the 
consciousness that it is’ (cpr,  p. 686  [a822 / b850]).  As long  as we 
acknowledge  the sufficiency of their grounds  or lack thereof,  all these 
modes of holding to be true  are epistemically  legitimate  in their  own  
right.11  Yet this does not entail that they each come with their own 
epistemic standards. For as I will show in §ii,  they have one crucial 
thing in common,  namely, they all obey the same rational norm.  To 
support this claim, I will defend the thesis that the rational procedure 
that in many ways defines Kant’s ethics, the universalizability test, is 
also applicable  to the epistemic domain. 
 
 
2. The  Epistemic  Formula  of  Universal  Law:  The  
Universalizability Test of Epistemic Maxims 
Famously for Kant, maxims of action are only morally permissible if 
they pass a universalizability test. Its function  is to rule out  any 
maxim  that  cannot  become  a universal law. In the following  
passage, Kant suggests that  epistemic maxims should also pass a 
universalizability test. 
 
To make use of one’s own reason  means no more than  to ask 
oneself, whenever  one  is supposed  to  assume  something,  
whether  one  could find it feasible to make the ground  or the rule 
on which one assumes it into a universal principle for the use of 
reason. This test is one that everyone can apply to himself. (wot, 
p. 18 [8:146 n.]) 
Whilst this is as close as Kant gets to explicitly formulating an 
epistemic universalizability test, I aim to show  that  such a test can 
be reconstructed on the model of the formula  of universal law. 
The moral  version  of the formula  of universal  law states  that  ‘I 
ought  never to act except  in such a way that  I could  also will that 
my maxim  should  become a universal  law’ (g, p. 94 [4:402]).  Testing 
the universalizability of a maxim establishes whether  it is permissible  
                                                             
11 Kant adds that  if we fail to acknowledge the grounds  of our beliefs, we are 
merely persuaded,  ‘a holding-to-be-true on insufficient grounds,  of which one 
does not know whether they are merely subjective or also objective’. 
Unsurprisingly, ‘Many remain with persuasion. Some come to reflection,  few 




by  determining   whether   it  can  become  a  universal  law without  
generating   contradictions.  Thereby,  it  stipulates   what  is morally 
wrong (to act on any maxim that cannot be universalized without 
leading to a contradiction); what  is morally  obligatory (to refrain 
from acting on any impermissible maxim and to act on the opposite  
maxim);  and  what  is morally  permissible  (to perform  any action  
based on a maxim  that  passes the universalizability test).12  If we 
apply this model to the epistemic realm, the formula  of universal law 
might be formulated as follows: ‘I ought  never to think  except in 
such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a 
universal law.’ What does it mean for an epistemic maxim to be able to 
become a universal  law? To make  sense of this, I shall begin by 
looking at maxims that are unable to become universal laws. 
A function  of the universalizability test is to identify the maxims that 
necessarily produce  unjustified  beliefs, maxims that Kant refers to as 
prejudices.  Whilst it is commonly  thought  of as an unjustified belief, 
for Kant a prejudice is an illegitimate principle the subject has adopted 
as his epistemic maxim: ‘Prejudice is a maxim of judging objectively  
from  subjective  grounds’  (ll, p. 473  [24:737]).13  Kant distinguishes 
between prejudices according to their source, and in particular whether  
they  are  based  on  inclination, habit  or  imitation.14 First are 
excluded maxims that base beliefs on inclinations. Feelings only yield 
subjective certainty,  and as such, they should not be used as objective 
grounds.  Second are excluded maxims that base beliefs on habits.  The 
fact that  things have been a certain  way until now does not justify the 
belief that they will remain the same in the future. Third are excluded 
maxims that base beliefs on imitation. Parroting  beliefs fails to  
                                                             
12 There is controversy surrounding the interpretation of Kant’s 
universalizability test. See, for instance, Wood (1999, pp. 40–2), O’Neill (1989,  
pp. 83 ff.) and Sullivan (1989, pp. 47–53). However,  these debates are 
irrelevant  to my argument, at least as it is stated here. 
13 See also ll (pp. 315–16  [24:864–5]): ‘The principal  sources of prejudices  are 
subjective causes, accordingly,  which are falsely held to be objective grounds.  
They serve, as it were, in place of principles,  because prejudices must be 
principles.’ 
14 ‘The principal  sources of prejudices are above all imitation, custom, and 
inclination’  (ll, p. 316  [25:865];  see also  ll, p. 579  [9:76]).  For  a discussion  




provide  any  insight  into  their  grounds.15 
What  these different  types of maxims  have in common  is that  they 
all use subjective  grounds  (i.e. inclination, habit  and  imitation)  as 
though  they were objective.  Since subjective grounds  are incapable of 
being  universalized,  they  cannot  be shared  by all,  and  on  this basis 
these maxims are impermissible.  By contrast, the maxims  that are 
permissible  can be adopted by all, at least in principle:  they are ‘valid 
for the reason  of every human  being to take it to be true; 
…regardless of the difference among the subjects’ (cpr, p. 685 [a820–
1/b848–9]). 
To substantiate this claim, let’s apply the universalizability test to a 
maxim  based on inclination. Say I am in the process of determining 
whether  I should believe that p. As I do so, I encounter a piece of 
evidence that  falsifies it. If I ignore this evidence and believe p any- 
way because it suits my desires, I am effectively thinking  under  the 
maxim: 
 
(¬em): I will ignore evidence in cases when it falsifies a belief I 
desire to be true.16 
I  believe  that   applying  the  universalizability  test  to  this  maxim 
should be done according  to the model of the practical  maxim of re- 
fusing to help others. 
According to Kant, I cannot  will the maxim ‘I do not care to con- 
tribute  anything  to [others’] welfare’ (g, p. 75 [4:423])  as universal 
law without generating  a contradiction in the will. For I am a finite 
dependent  being and I will most likely need help from others at some 
point; or at least I cannot  be certain that I will not need it. Yet if the 
maxim  of refusing to help others  were universalized,  I would  never 
receive help from others, and I cannot possibly will this to be the case in 
light of my lack of self-sufficiency. Therefore,  the universalization of 
the maxim not to help others leads to a contradiction in the will, from 
                                                             
15 Note  that  a different  kind of imitation can be legitimate  in an educational 
context. See, for instance,  a (p. 329 [7:225]). 
16 Typical examples of maxims of this kind are maxims of wishful thinking:  
‘Frequently we take  something  to  be certain  merely because  it pleases us, 
and  we take  something  to  be uncertain merely  because  it displeases  or 
annoys  us. This  certainty  or  uncertainty is not objective, however,  but 




which it follows that first, I ought not to act on it, and second, I have 
the duty to act on the opposite  maxim:  ‘I ought  to help others’. As is 
well known,  what  the contradiction in the will actually consists in is 
the object of numerous  debates in the literature, and it falls beyond the 
remit of this paper to defend a particular interpretation of it.17 Instead,  
I will focus on the epistemic version of the test and show that the 
maxim ‘I will ignore evidence in cases when it falsifies a belief I desire 
to be true’ (¬em) cannot  be willed as universal law without generating  
an epistemic contradiction in the will. 
The epistemic version of the argument goes as follows. I am a 
cognitively dependent  being who needs epistemic help from others. 
Yet if the maxim  ¬em were universalized,  others’ beliefs would  be 
unreliable.  I could never be sure whether  any given belief they hold is 
based  on their  wishes or on objective grounds.18  On  this basis, I 
could never rely on their cognitive contribution, which, as an 
epistemically  dependent   being,  I  cannot   possibly  will.  Therefore,   
the maxim ¬em leads to a contradiction in the will: I cannot  
consistently will it to be a universal law. 
Of course, one might object that this argument faces the same 
difficulties as its moral  version.  Just as with  Sidgwick’s self-sufficient 
man  (i.e. a strong  man  could  choose  to adopt  an egoistic practical 
maxim  without contradiction if it  were  advantageous to  him),  a 
strong mind could choose to adopt  an individualistic  epistemic 
maxim.1919  For instance, someone endowed  with remarkable cognitive 
                                                             
17 It is generally  agreed  that  three  interpretations are available.  The logical 
contradiction interpretation suggests that the universalization of the maxim 
would make the action it pro- poses inconceivable.  The teleological 
contradiction suggests that the universalization of the maxim is inconsistent 
with a systematic harmony of purposes.  Finally, the practical  contradiction 
suggests that the universalization of the maxim would be self-defeating in the 
sense that  the agent  would  be thwarting his own  purpose.  For a discussion  
of these interpretations, see Korsgaard (1996,  pp. 78–102). 
18 Note that the difference between the world where ¬em is a universal law and 
the actual world  is that  in the former  I know  that  I can never rely on others’  
beliefs. In the actual world, others do not necessarily ignore evidence in cases 
when it falsifies a belief they desire to be true. 
19 According to Sidgwick, ‘a strong man, after balancing the chances of life, may 
easily think that he and such as he have more to gain, on the whole, by the 
general adoption of the egoistic maxim;  benevolence  being  likely to  bring  




talents could decide that  epistemic self-reliance would  be more 
beneficial to him in the long run. He would thus be able to renounce 
others’ cognitive help and adopt  ¬em as an epistemic maxim  without 
generating a contradiction in the will. However,  irrespective of our 
particular talents, I believe we cannot possibly renounce others’ 
cognitive contribution.20  As far as cognition  is concerned,  no one can 
get by alone, since ‘Whoever is excellent in one talent, is not necessarily 
for that  reason  excellent in all of them.  For the kinds  of cognition  
involved are diverse’ (la, pp. 419–20  [25:1308–9]).21 The erudite per- 
son’s talent for scholarship is worthless  without the architectonic 
mind’s capacity to make use of it by drawing unexpected connections. 
The mechanical  mind may not be capable of the inspired insights of 
natural minds, but they are both necessary to human  cognition. 
Knowledge is by nature  a collaborative task, and renouncing  others’ 
cognitive contribution would amount to renouncing the whole of human 
knowledge all together,  which I cannot possibly will to do.22 On this 
basis, since I cannot  consistently will ¬em to be a universal law, first, I 
ought to refrain from acting on it. And second, I have the duty to act on 
                                                                                                                                             
Callanan for  raising  this  point  and  encouraging me to refine my account  of 
the epistemic test. 
20 As Kant  often  notes  in his anthropological works,  there  is a great  
variation amongst human  beings’  cognitive  talents — there  are  the  great  
geniuses  who  ‘take  new  paths  and open new prospects’,  the mechanical  
minds who ‘[advance] slowly on the rod and staff of experience’,  the 
universal  mind who  ‘grasps all the various  sciences’, the superficial  mind 
‘who  knows  the  titles  of  everything  but  not  the  contents’,  the  
architectonic mind  who ‘methodically  examines  the  connection  of  all  the  
sciences  and  how  they  support one another’, the natural minds who think  
‘out for themselves’, and the gigantic erudite  mind who  misses ‘the eye of 
true  philosophy’ (a,  pp. 330–1  [7:226–7]). As I have shown  elsewhere, on 
Kant’s account,  Nature has intended  to realize the cognitive unity of the 
human species by spreading  out cognitive talents amongst various types of 
knowers.  Therefore,  it is part  of its plan  for the species to use their  cognitive  
diversity  to secure their  survival  and progress towards cognitive perfection;  
see Cohen (2014). 
21 See also a (p. 332 [7:227]): ‘What do I want? (asks understanding). What  
does it matter? (asks the power of judgment).  What  comes of it? (asks reason). 
Minds differ greatly in their ability to answer all three of these questions.’ 
22 One could be tempted  to put forward a weaker  claim. For instance,  I can 
never be sure that I will not need others’ cognitive help at some point. However,  
this argument would be more vulnerable to Sidgwick-type objections than the 




the opposite  maxim  (¬¬em 1- em): ‘I will not ignore evidence in 
cases when it falsifies a belief I desire to be true.’ 23 
Therefore,  in the case of the epistemic role of evidence, the 
application  of the universalizability test to the epistemic realm 
produces results that  are compatible  with Kant’s familiar  epistemic 
positions. In the following  section,  I turn  to the case of testimony  in 
order  to show  that  the  universalizability test  also  produces  
unexpected results, and  that  these results  have the potential  to form  
the basis of fresh Kantian  answers to contemporary questions. 
 
 
3. Test Case: Testimony 
A number  of commentators have argued  that Kant belongs to an 
individualist  tradition according  to which testimony has little 
epistemic importance.24  If testimony  is epistemically unreliable,  it 
should follow that either we have a duty not to rely on it or we can 
only rely on it if it plays a merely corroborative role. Either way, on 
this view testimony  is not, and should not be, a fundamental  source of 
knowledge.  By contrast with this interpretation, I contend  that  Kant’s 
epistemic universalizability test commits him to the opposite  position.  
To support this claim, I will test the maxim that  rejects belief in 
testimony  (what  Kant calls the maxim of incredulity, ‘To be 
incredulous means to stick to the maxim not to believe testimony  at 
all’: cj, p. 336 [5:472])  and show that  it fails the universalizability  
test in more than one way. 
First,  if I were to reject testimony  as a source  of information, I 
would be unable to perform  the duty to think myself in the place of 
others (i.e. the duty of extended  thought). For the realization of this 
duty requires  that  one ‘reflects on his own judgment  from a universal 
standpoint (which he can only determine  by putting  himself into the 
standpoint of others)’  (cj, p. 175  [5:295]).  Yet I cannot  access the 
                                                             
23 Of course, a lot of work remains to be done in order to determine  whether  a 
general evidentialist maxim can be grounded on the basis of the epistemic 
formula of universal law and what form it should take. For instance, the degree 
of certainty  of my belief ought to be pro- portioned to the evidence I possess. 
However,  it falls beyond the remit of this paper to do so. For an insightful 
Kantian  inspired discussion of evidentialism, see Wood (2008). 
24 See, for instance,  Schmitt’s claim that  in Kant’s philosophy, ‘there is no 




standpoint of others  without relying on their testimony.  There- 
fore, trusting  testimony  in the absence  of defeating  conditions  is a 
pragmatically necessary  means  to realize one of my core epistemic 
duties. 
Second, the maxim  ‘I will not  believe testimony’  can be thought of  
on  the  model  of  the  maxim  not  to  keep  promises.  The  latter, when  
universalized,  entails what  Kant calls a contradiction in conception.  
Its  universalization would  lead  to  the  destruction of  the very 
practice of promise-making, which would entail that  ‘my maxim, as 
soon as it were made a universal law, would  have to destroy itself’ (g, 
p. 57 [4:403]).25 Similarly, the universalization of the maxim not to 
believe testimony would entail the disappearance of the practice of 
testimony,  since in a world in which no one believed testimony, giving 
it would become a pointless exercise. Therefore, this maxim  generates a 
contradiction in conception, and I have the duty to refrain from not 
believing testimony in the absence of defeating conditions. 
Third,   the  maxim   ‘I  will  not  believe  testimony’   can  also  be 
thought of on the model of the maxim  of refusing to help others  in 
need. As already spelt out, the latter, when universalized,  generates a 
contradiction in the will. Similarly, the universalization of the maxim 
not to believe testimony  would  lead to an inconsistency.  Since I am a 
cognitively dependent  being who relies on epistemic cooperation in a 
variety of ways, including  testimony,  my lack of self-sufficiency leads 
me to will that I rely on testimony if and when I need it. Therefore,  
first, I cannot  consistently  will that the maxim ‘I will not believe 
testimony’  be universalized.  Second, I have the duty  to will the 
opposite  maxim,  namely,  ‘I will believe testimony’ — although I 
should only do so in the absence of defeating conditions.26 
                                                             
25 See also g (p. 74 [4:422]). Just as with the contradiction in the will, Kant’s 
account  of the contradiction in conception is the object of interpretative 
debates I cannot engage with here. See, for  instance,  Korsgaard (1996,  pp. 
95–7),  Herman (1993,  pp. 137–41)  and  O’Neill (1989,  pp. 94–8). 
26 Far from recommending credulity,  the maxim that commands to believe 
testimony  is one of innocence  until proven  guilty, what  Gelfert calls ‘a 
presumptive principle  regarding  the acceptance  of testimony’  (Gelfert  2006,  
p. 627).  As Kant  writes,  ‘As for other  things  that concern  the credibility  and  
honorability of witnesses  who  make  assertions  about  experiences they have 




As a result, the application of the epistemic universalizability test 
to the issue of testimony suggests ways that it can be used to provide a 
number  of argumentative strategies.  For, as I have sketched,  testimony  
is not  merely  ineliminable  given the  kind  of cognitive  creatures  we 
are.  Rather,  first,  we need it; second,  we ought  to refrain from not 
believing it; and third,  we ought to believe it. 
 
 
4. Implications for Kant’s Ethics of Belief: One  and the Same Reason 
This paper has argued that the rational procedure  that applies to the 
moral domain  equally applies to the cognitive domain.  There is thus an 
analogy  between  our position  as moral  agents and as cognizers: our 
actions  and our thoughts function  analogically  in so far as they are 
subject  to the same rational norm.  However,  does the analogy go all 
the way down,  to the claim that the same normative  power is at  work  
in both  the moral  and  the cognitive  domains?  By way of conclusion,  
I would like to outline some reasons why this is a plausible implication  
of the account  I have just defended,  beginning  with the notion  of 
autonomy. 
As a result of the Kantian  picture  put forward in this paper,  
and contrary to what  is often  assumed,  autonomy is not  just the 
remit of practical  reason.  Our  capacity  for  rational agency underlies  
all our  cognitive  activity:  ‘[T]he power  to  judge autonomously — 
that is, freely (according  to principles  of thought  in general) — is 
called reason’ (cf, p. 255  [7:27]).  Just as we act autonomously if we 
act on the moral  principles we give ourselves, we believe 
autonomously if we believe on the  basis of the epistemic  principles  
we give our- selves. 
 
[F]reedom in thinking  signifies the subjection  of reason  to no 
laws ex- cept those which it gives itself; … if reason will not 
subject itself to the laws it gives itself, it has to bow under  the 
yoke of laws given by an- other.  (wot, p. 16 [8:145]) 
 
To make sense of the notion  of epistemic autonomy, let’s look briefly 
                                                                                                                                             
been  proved,  namely,  that  he deviates  from  the  truth’  (ll, p. 196  [24:246]). 
For an insightful parallel between trust and testimony,  see Gelfert (2006,  pp. 




at Kant’s account  of moral autonomy. According to Kant, all 
competing   ethical  theories  share  a  common  premiss:  they  define 
what  is  morally  good  on  the  basis  of  what  agents  (supposedly) 
want,  and prescribe  what  they should  do if they want  it to obtain, 




and so on. By relying on agents’ ends in one form or another, 
these theories  defend  what  Kant  calls heteronomous accounts  
of moral value — the good  is agent-relative, subjective  and  
contingent. They prescribe  that  ‘If I want  my action  to be 
right,  then I should  act on the basis of X’, with X taking the 
place of whichever value they put forward. By contrast, Kant’s 
moral law is of the form ‘You ought to X’; no ‘if’, no ‘then’.27  
Autonomy  as the source of moral value is de- fined in terms of 
what  all agents can will as a universal  law. It prescribes  for  
everyone,  equally  and  necessarily,  irrespective  of  their ends. 
On my interpretation of Kant’s account of cognition,  the same 
conception  of autonomy applies to the epistemic realm. All 
competing epistemic theories make the same mistake: they 
assign an unconditional  value to a given conception  of truth,  
whether  it is what  is supported by evidence, what is useful, 
what the community  believes, what god tells me and so on. 
They prescribe that ‘If I want my belief to be true, then I should  
accept it as true on the basis of X’, with X taking  the place of 
whichever  epistemic value they put forward. By contrast, just  
like his moral  principles,  Kant’s  epistemic  principles are of the 
form ‘You ought to X’; no ‘if’, no ‘then’.28  They command all, 
in the same way, and in all cases: ‘Thinking according  to a 
commonly  ruling  maxim  … is only  using your  own  reason  
as the  supreme touchstone of truth’  (la, p. 521 [25:1481]). The 
application of reason’s authority to a particular domain,  
whether  we are deliberating  about  what  to believe or what  to 
do, gives rise to moral  or epistemic norms. But Kant’s overall 
point is, I believe, that whatever the domain,  the source of 
normativity is the same: ‘there can, in the end, be only one and 
the same reason,  which must be distinguished merely in its 
application’ — what  he calls somewhat cryptically  ‘the unity  of 
practical  with  speculative  reason  in a common  principle’ (g, 
p. 46 [4:391]), namely, the categorical  imperative.29 
                                                             
27 For instance,  ‘Act only …’ (g, p. 73 [4:421]). 
28 For instance,  ‘Always thinking  …’ (la, p. 520 [25:1480]). 
29 See also cprr (p. 213 [5:91]): ‘… to attain  insight into the unity of the 




As a final piece of evidence for this claim, I would like to 
propose that each of the principles of the sensus communis 
could be interpreted as the epistemic equivalent of one of the 
formulations of the moral law (Table 1). First, the principle to 
think for oneself and the formula of the law of nature  both  
reject heteronomy. As shown  in §ii,  they command  that I act 
and think on universalizable  principles that can be shared  by 
everyone. Second, the principle  to think  oneself in the position 
of everyone else and the formula of humanity  both prescribe 
that I take others into consideration as rational beings, whether 
morally or cognitively.30 Cognition  ought not be an isolated 
enterprise in principle,  even if it could be in practice.  I ought 
to include the point of view of others as rational beings worthy  
of (theoretical) consideration and (practical) respect.31 Finally, 
the principle to always think consistently  and the formula  of 
the realm of ends both express a requirement  for systematicity  
in form as well as content.32 The worlds of nature  and freedom 
                                                                                                                                
everything from one principle — the undeniable need of human  reason,  
which finds complete satisfaction only in a complete systematic unity of 
its cognitions’. Whilst it goes beyond  the remit of this paper  to defend 
Kant’s claim about  the unity of reason,  my point  is that  the 
interpretation defended  in this paper can be seen as supporting it. For 
useful discussions  of the unity of reason  see, for instance, O’Neill  
(1989,  part  i),  Neiman  (1994,  pp. 76–7,  126–8),  Kleingeld  (1998)  
and  Nuzzo (2005,  pp. 57 ff.). 
30 ‘So act that you use humanity, whether  in your own person  or that 
of another, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a 
means’ (g, p. 80 [4:429]).  ‘As far as the second maxim  of the way of 
thinking  is concerned, … the way of thinking … reveals a man of a 
broad-minded way of thinking if he sets himself apart  from the 
subjective private conditions of the judgment, within  which so many 
others  are as if bracketed, and reflects on his own judgment  from a 
universal standpoint (which he can only determine  by putting  himself 
into the standpoint of others)’ (cj, p. 175 [5:295]). 
31 ‘A narrow-minded person is not one who has learned little, but who 
has no broad-minded concepts. His mode of thought is limited, he 
cannot  put himself in the place of another, but judges  merely  from  his 
own  standpoint in his  own  way,  and  never  sees a matter  from 
another point of view’ (la, p. 521 [25:1481]). 




both require consistency in acting and thinking, and these 
principles are expressions  of this requirement for lawlikeness.  
In  this  sense,  the  equivalence  of  our  epistemic  and  our 
moral  principles  could  help us make  sense of the idea that  
on the Kantian  picture we ought  to act and think  ‘only in 
accordance with that  maxim through which you can at the 
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laws for a merely possible  kingdom   of  ends’  (g,  p. 88  [4:439]).   ‘To  
think   consistently   is  also  called  “well- grounded thinking”, so that  
one always  remains  in connection and  is in agreement  with another’ 
(la, p. 521 [25:1482]). 
33 I would like to thank  the audience at the Aristotelian Society meeting 
for a very stimulating discussion. Unfortunately, I was unable to address 
all the questions  they raised here, but I hope to be able to do so in future 
work on these issues. An earlier version of this paper was presented  at 
the Colloque  of the Université de Neuchâtel, and I am grateful  to the 
participants,  and  in particular Daniel  Schultess, for helpful  comments.  
Out  of the many  people who  have helped  me in thinking  about  this 
topic,  particular thanks  go to John  Callanan, Cain  Todd,  and  most  of 
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